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Maureen Dean

Western Oregon University, maureendianedean@gmail.com

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The Growth of Pentecostalism in Brazil

by

Maureen D. Dean

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The Growth of Pentecostalism in Brazil

Pentecostalism is the largest and fastest growing religion not only in Brazil, but in the world. Because its growth contradicts previous predictions of sociologists that as economies develop, religiosity will diminish,¹ a large volume of research has been devoted to the subject. The result has generally been a consensus that Pentecostalism primarily attracts the Third World poor in populations who have been marginalized by globalization² and geographies where overall human development is low.³ Yet Brazil has not only made progressive strides in education and poverty, it is one of the fastest growing economies in the world.

In Brazil, Pentecostalism has grown so rapidly that statistics gathered for the *World Christian Encyclopedia* in 2000 show followers made up nearly 47 percent of the population,⁴ while the most recent census taken by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) in 2010 records approximately 42.3 million people (or 23 percent of the population) as Pentecostal. Still, a 2006 report by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life reported 49 percent of Brazil's population as Pentecostal, although they did acknowledge that samples taken in Brazil were not national, and had been disproportionately collected in urban areas.⁵

Traditional explanations for its growth maintain that Pentecostalism is a religious adaptation to urban culture,⁶ and has become a global religion for a globalized world because it addresses the personal alienation that accompanies urbanization. Known as “deprivation theory”

1. Paul Freston. “A Quiet Tendency to Spread the Word,” *Times Higher Education Supplement* 1749 (June 30, 2006): 20.

2. Paul Freston. “A Quiet Tendency,” 21.

3. Brian Grim. “Pentecostalism's Growth in Religiously Restricted Environments,” *Society* 46, no. 6 (Nov 2009): 484.

4. David B. Barrett, George T. Kurian and Todd M. Johnson. *World Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative Study of Churches and Religions in the Modern World, AD 1900-2000* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1982).

5. Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. *Spirit and Power: A 10-Country Survey of Pentecostals* Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, October 2006.

6. Freston. “Pentecostalism in Brazil: A Brief History,” *Religion* 25, no. 2 (1995): 131.

this explanation for the worldwide growth of Pentecostalism is “incomplete, at best.”⁷ It fails to explain the paradox of its simultaneously rapid growth in countries where human development and median incomes are high (such as the United States and the United Kingdom), or why the wealthy appear to be joining the Pentecostal movement at an ever increasing rate.

One possible explanation that has had little attention is the ever widening gap in income inequality which has resulted as a consequence of economic globalization. It is possible that Pentecostalism may be of as much utility to the poor as a coping strategy as it is to the rich as a tool of social control. Because the organizational structure of Pentecostal denominations follows an authoritarian model and there is a relationship between income inequality and the willingness of populations to accept authoritarianism,⁸ there may be cause for concern.

Despite Brazilian law separating church and state and the tendency of Pentecostals to view themselves as removed from the formal political sphere,⁹ Pentecostal churches in Brazil have become more and more aggressively involved in politics in recent years. They have installed their own people in public office, purchased powerful television and radio networks, and attempted to leverage their political power to “create representative organs capable of mediating the increasingly important relationship with the state”.¹⁰ One of the largest denominations, Bishop Edir Macedo's Universal Church of the Kingdom of God or the *Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus* (IURD) not only used his power with the votes of church members to guarantee election of three federal deputies in 1990 who would be sympathetic to his goal of

7. Frederick Solt, Philip Habel, and J. Tobin Grant. “Economic Inequality, Relative Power, and Religiosity,” *Social Science Quarterly* 92, no. 2 (June 2011): 448.

8. Frederick Solt. “The Social Origins of Authoritarianism,” *Political Research Quarterly* (Dec, 2012): 704.

9. Hannah K.W. Stewart-Gambino. “Religious Consumers in a Changing Religious Marketplace,” *Latin American Research Review* 36, no. 1 (2001): 193-206.

10. Paul Freston. “The Protestant Eruption into Modern Brazilian Politics,” *Journal of contemporary Religion* 11, no. 2 (1996): 193.

purchasing a large television network, but also installed six federal deputies in the government in 1994.¹¹

Are such maneuvers an acceptable by-product of a political tradition of clientelistic behavior, or could some of these organizations, with their coffers full of unknown millions, actually pose a threat to the democratization of Brazil? The acceptance of authoritarianism combined with the encouragement of nationalism and the power to control elections and monopolize media that may be used for propaganda, are all historical tenets of fascism. What level of concern should there be when it comes to tolerating the political access that groups like Macedo's have attained?

Is there any significant relationship between income inequality and the growth of Pentecostalism? And if so, does research show that nationalism and authoritarianism are natural companions of income inequality? Up until now, there has been a general agreement that because of the 'fissaparity' of the church – that is, the phenomena of individual believers perpetually starting new churches, and the tendency of those within larger denominations to break away and start new churches – there will never be enough institutional unity among Pentecostals to present any political threat. Observers may have created a false sense of security for themselves in these assessments, however, and a reassessment of the growth and perpetuation of Pentecostalism may be in order.

I. Evangelical vs. Pentecostal

Because the terms Pentecostal and Evangelical are sometimes used interchangeably, a clarification of their distinction for purposes of this paper is in order. *Evangelical* refers to the tradition within Protestant Christianity of emphasizing the authority of the Bible, personal

11. Freston. "Pentecostalism in Brazil," 129.

conversion, and the doctrine of salvation by faith in the Atonement.¹² It also places a strong emphasis on the importance of preaching as contrasted with ritual.^{13,14} *Pentecostal* refers to “any number of Christian sects and individuals emphasizing baptism in the Holy Spirit as evidenced by speaking in tongues, prophecy, healing, and exorcism [with reference to the baptism in the Holy Spirit at the first Pentecost (Acts 2: 9-11)].”¹⁵

So while most Pentecostals are Evangelicals, many Evangelicals are not Pentecostals, a distinction which has sometimes been problematic for Pentecostals. Because Pentecostal belief is centered around the events of the Pentecost¹⁶ described in Acts 2 that include the receipt of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit as evidenced by speaking in tongues (also known as *glossolalia*), then according to Pentecostal belief, an individual who has never spoken in tongues has not received the Holy Spirit. Yet the famous evangelist, Reverend Billy Graham, who is a hero to most Pentecostals, has admitted never speaking in tongues. Nevertheless, most Pentecostals believe that Reverend Graham is definitely filled with the Gifts of the Holy Spirit. To maintain otherwise would not only negate the evangelical work he has done, including the conversion of millions of people who subsequently adopted the Pentecostal faith, but it would also mean that he is not eligible for Kingdom of God and eternal life. This rigidity of Pentecostal belief regarding tongues is one of those cognitive dissonance moments that Pentecostals have had to grapple with.

12. *Atonement* being defined as the reconciliation of God and man through the death of Jesus Christ.

13. *The New Merriam-Webster Dictionary* (1989), s.v. “Evangelical”.

14. *Oxford English Dictionary online*, s.v. “Evangelical,” Accessed Nov 12, 2012, <http://oxforddictionaries.com>.

15. *Oxford English Dictionary online*, s.v. “Pentecostal,” Accessed Nov12, 2012 <http://oxforddictionaries.com>.

16. A Christian celebration of the day the apostles received the Holy Spirit.

Another reason it is important to understand the variance in terminology used to describe Pentecostals is in the examination of statistical research. For example, in statistics from the 2006 report by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life,¹⁷ Pentecostals have been separated from Charismatics (who also hold Pentecostal beliefs), and then reclassified together under the heading of “Renewalists”. In contrast, statistics regarding the renewalist churches or *renovados* in Brazil refer only to those historical protestant churches who either converted to Pentecostalism or became off-shoots of the historical church, and added *Renewalist* to their official names as a way of indicating their Pentecostal belief.¹⁸ In addition, when the IBGE records its census data on religion, it breaks Evangelicals into subheadings of *Evangélicas de missão* and *Evangélicas de origem pentecostal*, and the Brazilian churches listed under *Evangélicas de missão* (such as *Igreja evangélica metodista* or *Igreja evangélica adventista*¹⁹) are churches which have adapted to Pentecostalism, even though a companion church with the same name in another country may not be practicing this way. Therefore, for purposes of this paper, “Pentecostal” will be the only term used to describe this group.

II. History of Pentecostalism in Brazil

The original Pentecostal movement began in Los Angeles, California in 1906 with a revival meeting led by African American preacher William Seymore, who believed in *glossolalia* as evidence of receipt of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit. Known as the Azusa Street Revival, the meeting continued for several years and was the catalyst for church leaders who, after receiving the Holy Spirit in this manner, subsequently went out and established Pentecostal churches around the world.

17. Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. *Spirit and Power*, 4.

18. For example, the *Igreja Batista Renovada* and the *Igreja Presbiteriana Renovada* (Renewed Baptist Church and Renewed Presbyterian Church).

19. See Appendix A.

While there are numerous Pentecostal churches in Brazil today, Paul Freston divides their chronological emergence into three main waves:²⁰

1. Assemblies of God and the Christian Congregation of Brazil (1911);
2. Church of the Foursquare Gospel (1953), Brazil for Christ (1955), and God is Love (1962); and
3. Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (IURD) (1977).

Assemblies of God (AG), Foursquare, and IURD were the matrices for all other Pentecostal churches in Brazil.²¹ Brazil for Christ and God is Love were founded by former members of Assemblies of God, and the IURD was founded by a former member of New Life, which was also founded by a former member of AG. Assemblies of God was the first Pentecostal church, and was established in 1911 by two Swedish Baptist missionaries (Gunnar Vingren and Daniel Berg), acting on a prophecy to go to the state of Pará in northern Brazil. After their message caused a schism in the Baptist church in Belém, they were expelled along with 11 others, and set up the “Apostle Faith Mission,” which later became the “Assemblies of God.”²² By 1930, the Assemblies of God church had spread throughout all the states of Brazil and continues to be the only Pentecostal church with a nationwide geographical presence today.²³

Also motivated by prophecy, an Italian missionary who never even lived in Brazil, founded the Christian Congregation of Brazil (CCB). Both the Swedish founders of the AG and the Italian founder of the CCB had emigrated to the United States, where they were exposed to Pentecostalism, while the Foursquare church was founded by an American missionary who traveled to Brazil. The entire movement began outside Brazil and was brought there by

20. Freston, “Pentecostalism in Brazil,” 119-133.

21. Cecília Loreto Mariz, *Coping with Poverty: Pentecostals and Christian Base Communities in Brazil* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994): 25.

22. Freston, “Pentecostalism in Brazil,” 122.

23. Freston, “Pentecostalism in Brazil,” 121.

outsiders. Brazil for Christ was the first church founded by a native Brazilian, as were God is Love and the IURD. As missionary churches, the Pentecostal movement was originally funded by outsiders, and many churches continue to receive large amounts of money from churches in other countries today.

III. The Growth of Pentecostalism

Beginning with the emergence of Catholic base communities (CEBs), social scientists have taken an interest in studying religion in Brazil and its ability “to foster or hinder modernization.”²⁴ Because religiosity was expected to decline with modernization, the growth of Pentecostalism has been intriguing, and questions surrounding why it has grown so rapidly continue to be the focus of research. So far, however, there is still a general consensus that Pentecostalism attracts mostly poor and uneducated Brazilians who are frustrated with their socio-economic lot in modern industrial society. Some also believe Pentecostalism is a backlash to CEBs and Liberation Theology, and that its power to draw Catholic practitioners away is because its focus on the supernatural that can be experienced on a daily basis²⁵ more closely parallels the mysticism of traditional Afro-Brazilian religions.

Freston maintains that the IURD represents an intersection of Brazilian religious tradition and modern urban culture,²⁶ but Pentecostal practices actually run contrary to this idea. While Pentecostalism may be a reaction to urban culture, its “intersection with Brazilian tradition” is debatable. Pentecostals do not follow the syncretic practices of traditional Afro-Brazilian religions or “folk Catholicism,”²⁷ but rather have a rigid and more singular focus on the correct

24. Hannah K.W. Stewart-Gambino. “Religious Consumers in a Changing Religious Marketplace,” *Latin American Research Review* 36, no. 1 (2001): 193-206.

25. Mariz, *Coping with Poverty*, 67.

26. Freston, “Pentecostalism in Brazil,” 131.

27. Referring to non-romanized Catholicism. Mariz, *Coping with Poverty*, 62.

way to practice Christianity. They are also very critical of the historical emphasis placed on symbols and rituals by Catholic and Afro-Brazilians religions, and specifically exclude symbols from their churches while encouraging spontaneous (as opposed to formal) prayer.²⁸ Any spirits other than the Holy Spirit are considered to be devils, and members are sometimes attracted to Pentecostalism as a protection from the magic of traditional religions. In fact, the focus of Pentecostal belief can be so single-minded and exclusionary that some pastors have used it to engage in violent rhetoric that resulted in member attacks on people believed to be practicing Afro-Brazilian religions because they were dressed in white (*umbanistas* wear white), even though victims have occasionally turned out to be health care workers.²⁹ Such “outbreaks of violence constitute dramatic departures from the Brazilian tradition of religious tolerance.”³⁰

As a religion brought to Brazil by outsiders, some have accused the American CIA of funding the Pentecostal movement as a response to the Marxist thinking embedded in the philosophy of the CEBs.³¹ It does not appear, however, that the growth of Pentecostalism is any kind of backlash to CEBs and Liberation Theology. This suggestion is based on the idea that the deemphasis of spiritual and mystical elements of faith by the CEBs drove the poor to seek them elsewhere.³² Even though CEBs were addressing the needs of the poor, the poor who were drawn to CEBs were those who were able to actively participate in them, and this group did not include the wide swath of population that was ultimately drawn to Pentecostalism.

Cécilia Mariz is a Brazilian national and Professor of Sociology at the Universidade Federal de Pernambuco in Recife. In her field studies of participants in CEBs, Pentecostalism,

28. Mariz, *Coping with Poverty*, 65.

29. Joseph Page, *The Brazilians* (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1995): 381.

30. Page, *The Brazilians*, 381.

31. Page, *The Brazilians*, 376.

32. Page, *The Brazilians*, 377.

and Afro-Brazilian religions, Mariz points out that the very nature of Pentecostalism serves those who were never well-served by CEBs and *vice versa*. One of the primary differences between the emphasis of the CEB and the Pentecostal faith is the focus on community rather than the individual. When Mariz interviewed CEB leaders, she found that they were aware the poorest of the poor could not participate, and that most of the leaders and participants were women who did not work outside the home or men who were not employed.³³ The activities of CEBs are not conducive to those who are employed. They require personal time, that might otherwise be spent with family, to be devoted to the community, and many poor people simply cannot afford to do this. Mariz found that once an individual was employed, it was not uncommon for them to leave the CEB for this very reason – lack of time. This is not to say that the Pentecostal faith does not require participation and time from their members, but the time demands made on Pentecostals by the church are more easily met by those who are working and have demanding personal responsibilities, like children at home.

The other reason CEBs lacked the attraction of Pentecostalism is because of the Pentecostal emphasis on divine healing. One of the most common claims by converts to Pentecostalism is deliverance from addictions like alcoholism (as Mariz points out, a personal problem that would have kept a person from being able to participate in a CEB). Since alcoholism is one of the most serious problems among the poor, and households headed by alcoholics tend to experience the worst poverty in Brazil,³⁴ it is obvious why power to heal the individual would hold such a strong attraction for the poor. Conversion to Pentecostalism has been credited with healing a range of afflictions from mental illness to alcoholism and drug addiction. Therefore, the *Movimento de Cura Divina* (Movement for Divine Healing) has been

33. Mariz, *Coping with Poverty*, 46.

34. Mariz, *Coping with Poverty*, 148.

its dominant attraction for Brazilians.

IV. Movement for Divine Healing

While there are many types of Pentecostal churches in Brazil, including the renewal churches (*renovados*), which are off-shoots of historical churches, the fastest growing are those with an emphasis on divine healing, such as that of the IURD. Most of these divine healing churches have less rigid moral restrictions than traditional Pentecostal churches, and are primarily focused on expelling the Afro-Brazilian spirits which are identified as evil spirits.³⁵ Whereas CEBs do not deal in the supernatural, and Afro-Brazilian religions generally accept *all* of the supernatural, for the Pentecostal, there is only one acceptable spirit, the Holy Spirit.

Paul Freston, who is the author of several books on Protestantism and politics in Latin America, completed his doctoral thesis on Protestants and politics in Brazil at the University of Campinas, Brazil, and has published extensively in Portuguese and English on the sociology of Protestantism in Latin America. In his analysis of the growth of the Foursquare church in Brazil, he reduces the appeal of the church to an operation of the consumer market. Freston says that the Pentecostal church has “displaced sin and hell with the felt needs of physical and psychological healing,” as an adaptation to a consumer society and the religious market.³⁶ But his intimation that people are choosing what's less morally challenging because it's easier and more physically gratifying is an oversimplification and appears to lack a legitimate understanding of the commitment required to participate in the Brazilian Pentecostal church.

Even in the more relaxed Pentecostal churches, expectations of self discipline are high, and a constant effort must be made not to do what is referred to as “backsliding” (a reference to

35. Mariz, *Coping with Poverty*, 26.

36. Freston “Pentecostalism in Brazil,” 131.

reverting to unacceptable behaviors). Moral expectations are strict, particularly when compared with traditional Catholicism, which holds the expectation that through the sacraments of confession and repentance, a member who has sinned may remain within the church body. In the Brazilian Pentecostal church, however, when a woman becomes pregnant out of wedlock, she is expelled from the church and may not return (although she is free to join a *different* congregation, if she repents of this behavior.)³⁷ For women in the Pentecostal church, not only moral codes, but conservative dress codes are used to establish respect and obedience, as well as foster self-esteem among members. Freston's consumer market explanation of the popularity of the movement of divine healing is weak. A more viable explanation of its popularity is its gift of power to the powerless.

V. Power for the Powerless

Religion can be a powerful coping mechanism for the poor because it removes the feeling of powerlessness inherent to the condition of poverty. Healing and miracles are part of the daily life of Pentecostals. Conversions often come about through healing, which is a testament to the power of the religion as well as the empowerment of the individual. The individual has only but to truly believe for the supernatural occur. While Pentecostalism is not unique in helping people to overcome powerlessness, it is unique in interpreting miracles as "part of God's plan."³⁸

The Pentecostal church in Brazil has indeed enjoyed its widest appeal among poor people, and as of 1995, its membership was still made up mostly of the poor.³⁹ Some see the Pentecostal movement as a factor that will contribute to improvement for the poor, while others feel that the conservatism of the Pentecostal message will foster political withdrawal and hinder

37. Mariz, *Coping with Poverty*, 150.

38. Mariz, *Coping with Poverty*, 145.

39. Mariz, *Coping with Poverty*, 80.

social change.⁴⁰ There is evidence to show, however, that while converts may become more productive (as in the case of the former alcoholic who becomes employable), the strong work ethic promoted by Pentecostalism is *not* a new creation for the member. Even though conversion to Pentecostalism has served to promote literacy in adults (who learn to read because of their motivation to read the Bible),⁴¹ it does not result in any improved mobility that can elevate its followers out of poverty.

In her personal studies of Spiritists, traditional Catholics, CEB members, and Pentecostals, Mariz found that all of them defined themselves as hard workers and considered being called a “hard worker” as a compliment and a form of self-definition. Even though religious conversion did not establish a work ethic they did not already have, because of the healing that often accompanies conversion to Pentecostalism (as in the case of the recovered alcoholic), Pentecostal converts are often affected economically because of the member's new ability to participate in that work ethic. More importantly, what was unique among Pentecostals was that economic and work success was always credited to “God's blessing,” a work ethic not found in other religions among the poor.⁴²

With those claiming Pentecostal affiliation making up nearly half of the population of Brazil today, there are certainly some interesting questions about the long-term positive effects of a religion that motivates literacy in adults and recovery from alcoholism and drugs. However, it could be said that because of their attribution of economic success to God's will, Pentecostalism may also work more to foster an acceptance of poverty rather than deliverance from it. Evidence shows that while some of the positive effects of conversion may promote movement to higher

40. Mariz, *Coping with Poverty*, 67.

41. Mariz, *Coping with Poverty*, 135.

42. Mariz, *Coping with Poverty*, 123.

stratas of poverty (for example, learning to read), even those who would educate themselves are rarely allowed to move out of poverty in Brazil and into the middle class.

In order to consider the relationship of poverty to Pentecostalism, it is important to understand the chronic nature of poverty in Brazil. While nearly insurmountable class barriers prevent the poor from rising out of poverty, movement within the strata of poor is dependent on one's ability to cope with poverty.⁴³ The nature of personal empowerment that Pentecostalism can provide is a useful tool for coping. Converts report improvements to their lives, such as spiritual peace, better health and more personal stability as a consequence of overcoming health problems.⁴⁴ However, in her review of the research regarding *Weberian theory*⁴⁵ (which holds that the Protestant ethic will provide an economic advantage in capitalist society), Mariz found that although Pentecostal churches and some of their pastors might become greatly enriched over time, the material conditions of most Pentecostal members did not change substantially.⁴⁶ This finding is in spite of the claim of Pentecostals themselves to have experienced economic improvement after conversion, a belief which is also shared by their pastors.

VI. The Issue of Income Inequality

Before examining the issue of income inequality in Brazil, it is helpful to place it in the wider context of income inequality in the world, as well as provide a description of the GINI Index and SWID database, which were used to compile statistics for the Tables presented in this paper.

A. The Human Development Index (HDI) and Pentecostalism

43. Mariz, *Coping with Poverty*, 34.

44. Mariz, *Coping with Poverty*, 35.

45. Referring to Maximilian Weber and his book *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*.

46. Mariz, *Coping with Poverty*, 35.

Because social scientists have traditionally held that Pentecostalism is primarily attractive to poor people in countries with low human development, there is a contradiction that needs to be considered in countries where human development is high or poverty has improved, and Pentecostalism continues to grow. There should also be a legitimate curiosity by researchers as to why Pentecostalism continues to be so attractive to people in countries with high rates of human development and income, such as the United Kingdom and the United States.

The United Nations Human Development Index (HDI), which is compiled as part of their annual Human Development Report (HDR),⁴⁷ gathers statistics on a variety of factors of human development, ranging from poverty, education and gender issues, to income inequality. A review of statistics from the 1998 HDI⁴⁸ presents two questions:

1. What do countries on the low end of the HDI spectrum like Kenya and Nigeria, whose rankings for 1998 were 138 and 151 respectively, have in common with high ranking countries like the United Kingdom or the United States, when all four of these countries are experiencing rapid growth in Pentecostalism?;

2. Why are countries with high HDIs like the U.S. and the U.K. experiencing rapid growth in Pentecostalism while other countries with high HDIs like Norway (no. 2) and Sweden (no. 6) are not? Any proposal that the variance between cultures is so broad as to account for this gap is inadequate.

Because the United States has a high rate of human development and income compared to the Third World, researchers have chronically dismissed it as an “exception” when trying to justify the rapid growth of Pentecostalism in developing countries like Brazil as a by-product of

47. United Nations. “Human Development Indicators” in *Human Development Report 2000*. Ed. Bruce Ross-Larson. Published for the United Nations Development Programme, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

48. See Appendix B.

poverty and low human development. Because the Pentecostal movement began in the United States, there is a certain irony in this dismissal and their unwillingness to look at how that movement grew and is growing today as relevant to the Third World. Instead of excluding the growth of Pentecostalism in the United States as irrelevant to the Third World, its *inclusion* suggests a commonality with Brazil and other countries that merits attention and should motivate more in depth research – income inequality.

B. The GINI Index and the SWID Database

In order to examine such a potential relationship, statistics on income inequality need to be paired with statistics on the growth of Pentecostalism, and correlates of human development must also be considered. The GINI index, a coefficient based on a scientific model called the Lorenz curve,⁴⁹ is the most commonly accepted equation that has been used worldwide, including by the IBGE, as an indicator of income inequality. However, calculation of the GINI coefficient is a complex task, and finding reliable figures for Brazil and other countries presents an obstacle to this type of research since traditional sources for the GINI, including the United Nations, World Bank, and CIA Factbook, sometimes have different figures and none have been able to offer comprehensive figures for countries across time.

Fortunately, in 2009, Dr. Frederick Solt, an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Southern Illinois University, who has written extensively on income inequality, recognized that “cross-national research on the causes and consequences of income

49. “A model developed by economist Max Lorenz in 1905. It represents a probability distribution of statistical values, and is often associated with income distribution calculations. For example, a Lorenz curve can show that the bottom 40 percent of households bring in 25 percent of a country's income. If income distribution were perfectly equal, 40 percent of households would bring in 40 percent of income.”http://www.investorwords.com/6570/Lorenz_curve.html.

inequality [had] been hindered by the limitations of existing inequality data sets”⁵⁰ and responded to the problem by creating a project called the *Standardized World Income Inequality Database* or SWID.⁵¹ The SWID, drawing on a variety of resources, provides comparable GINI indices of gross and net income inequality along with estimates for margins of error,⁵² and includes 173 countries with data as far back as 1960 where available. The SWID is provided free to researchers on the web in *Excel* format, and is continually updated as more and/or better information becomes available. It is an invaluable tool for examining the theory of a causal relationship between income inequality and the growth of Pentecostalism, and may produce data supporting the need to reexamine current psycho-sociological theories about the modern attraction of Pentecostalism worldwide. Further research in this area is needed.

C. The World Christian Encyclopedia

For purposes of this paper in measuring the growth of Pentecostalism, *The World Christian Encyclopedia*⁵³ was selected. It includes data collected through the year 2000, and is the source for the figures offered in Table B. Notwithstanding the problematic nature of collecting statistics on religious membership, *i.e.* that such numbers are only as good as the individuals and/or churches reporting that information, there is reason to consider pursuit of this research. A report released in 2006 by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life⁵⁴ claimed that Pentecostals made up 10 percent or more of the populations of Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, the Philippines, South Korea, and the United States. Although this figure tells nothing about the relative growth of Pentecostalism in these countries, it is still notable that

50. Frederick Solt. “Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database,” *Social Science Quarterly* 90, no. 2 (June 2009): 231.

51. Frederick Solt. *The Standardized World Income Inequality Database*, <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/11992> V4 (2009).

52. Solt, “Standardizing the World,” 231.

53. David Barrett, et al. *World Christian Encyclopedia*.

54. Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. *Spirit and Power*, 4.

out of 133 countries with a recorded GINI index for 2005,⁵⁵ as shown in Table A, all but South Korea lingered low on the list, including the United States, as follows: Brazil-115; Chile-116; Guatemala-127; Kenya-108; South Africa-132; the Philippines-99; South Korea-28; and the United States-63.

As Dr. Solt has noted, recent work in the sociology of religion has largely neglected the role of economic inequality,⁵⁶ and except for Dr. Solt, there seems to be no one suggesting that income inequality may be a major player in the paradoxical growth of Pentecostal churches. Recognizing and understanding the potential impact of such causality is important because it has the potential to nullify predictions that institutional fragmentation of Pentecostals will prevent them from developing political power of any concern. Again, further research is needed.

D. Income Inequality in Brazil

Any discussion of income inequality in Brazil must begin with statistics on the rising median income, and any discussion of median income must be qualified by actual numbers because of the way in which they highlight the broadening income gap.

The HDI for Brazil as reported by the United Nations is evidence that Brazil has indeed made progressive strides in education and poverty. In 1998, Brazil was ranked 74 out of 150 countries assessed. In 1998, a rank of 74 placed Brazil in the “Medium” category for human development out of categories of “High, Medium, and Low”, a rank which would now place it as “High” since the categories were later expanded to include “Very High.” Because the HDI takes into consideration factors including poverty and education, then if logic follows, as human development improves, there should be at least a leveling off, if not a reduction, in the growth of

55. No GINI index for Nigeria in 2005 was available; however, Nigeria had a GINI rank of 94 out of 136 countries recorded in 2004.

56. Solt, “Economic Inequality”, 447.

Pentecostalism, but that is simply not the case. Brazil's progress in education, poverty, and human development have continued to improve, yet figures from the *World Christian Encyclopedia* show the Pentecostal church grew from 7.2 percent of the population in 1970 to 47.0 percent of the population in 2000.

Although Brazil has seen a steady increase in GDP *per capita* income over time, it has also experienced a simultaneous increase in income inequality. Between the years 1975 and 1998, while the GDP *per capita* income went from \$3,464 to \$4,509,⁵⁷ income inequality, as represented by the GINI Index, went from 42.4118 in 1970 to 51.67709 in 1998, and the current gap (according to the 2010 IBGE census) can be described as follows: The poorest 10 percent earn 1.1 percent of the country's earnings, while the richest 10 percent earn 44.5 percent; the poorest worker earns approximately \$928.80 per year, while the richest 1 percent earn an average of \$112,000.00 per year.⁵⁸

Table B shows the relationship of income inequality to Pentecostalism in Brazil and several other countries from 1970 to 2000, using the latest version of the SWID data set⁵⁹ and the *Pearson r* to calculate the correlation. The Table is incomplete, but with an initial correlation of 0.704714, there would seem to be reason to pursue this research further. It also shows a GINI coefficient for Brazil that first increased, then decreased slightly over 30 years from 42.4118 to 51.91955, but as such still remains one of the highest GINI numbers in the world, ranked at 126 out of 141 in 2000, as shown in Table C. The GINI coefficient offered by the IBGE for 2000 is

57. United Nations. *Human Development Report 2000*.

58. "In Booming Brazil, Census Shows Income Gap Persists." <http://www.worldcrunch.com/booming-brazil-census-shows-income-gap-persists/business-finance/in-booming-brazil-census-shows-income-gap-persists/c2s4115/>. Original article published by *America Economica*. Nov 20, 2011. Accessed December 1, 2012.

59. Solt, *The Standardized World Income Inequality Database*.

even higher at 61.1,⁶⁰ although this number may have been calculated before taxes and transfers and the numbers provided in Table B are net figures.

Table B also raises the question as to whether such a correlation is unique to Brazil, or whether it reflects a larger worldwide pattern. Before any hypothesis can be made, a more comprehensive study of countries over time is in order, and more research is needed. While there is no denying that people who live in poverty are attracted to Pentecostalism, poverty does not appear to be the only force driving its continued growth.

VII. Relative Power Theory

We know that poverty attracts people to Pentecostalism, but does prosperity also attract them? Despite Freston's extensive background and research on Pentecostalism and politics in Latin America, his statement that it “is largely a non-white religion and is increasingly distant from worldly power and wealth”⁶¹ is either an attempt to placate the concerns of a specific audience, or somewhat naïve. Not only is there growing evidence that wealthy people are becoming increasingly attracted to the Pentecostal church, but as a religion first home grown in the United States, there has never been a shortage of outside funding for Pentecostal churches in Brazil, especially from the United States.

In their examination of the relationship of income inequality to religiosity, Frederick Solt, Philip Habel, and J. Tobin Grant asked whether as income inequality increases, does religion increase primarily as a source of comfort for the deprived (deprivation theory), or does it also become a tool of social control for the rich and powerful?⁶² After all, the *renovadas*, like the

60. See IBGE, *Censo Demográfico 2000*. Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (2000). http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/censo2000/trabalho_rendimento/tabrendbr123.pdf Accessed Nov 12, 2012. The table does not specify if figures are gross or net.

61. Freston, *A Quiet Tendency*, 21.

62. Solt, et al. *Economic Inequality*, 448.

Renewed Baptist Church and the Renewed Presbyterian Church, are now a phenomena of the historical Protestant churches in Brazil, and their membership is primarily middle class.⁶³

With the expanding gap in income inequality, there is also mounting evidence that wealthy people are joining the church at an increasing rate, which not only contradicts the theory that Pentecostalism is a religion for the poor, but presents new questions as to the potential influence of outside churches and wealthy individuals who are contributing to Brazilian churches both from inside and outside the country. As wealthy individuals join Pentecostal congregations and contribute according to their ability, do they gain more influence within the church body as a natural consequence of large donations? If so, it doesn't really matter whether such contributions are part of sincere active religious participation or a superficial offering intended to gain influence. If money equals influence in the church, then either way, it serves to put the minority of wealthy individuals in a position of wielding influence over the majority who live in poverty.

Some of the larger churches, like Assemblies of God and Foursquare Gospel, have received untold millions of dollars over the years of 'missions' money from their counterparts in the United States. Bishop Macedo has even set up branches of his native Brazilian IURD in the U.S. that are now contributing funds to the church in Brazil. The concept that wealthy foreign interests might avail themselves of religion and foreign missionaries to further their own purposes of wealth and power is not new. In the book *Thy Will Be Done*, Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett detail how over the course of the 20th century, big business and foreign interests, including the U.S. government and the CIA, used American missionaries in Latin America to prop up Latin American dictatorships, "secure resources, and pacify indigenous

63. Mariz, *Coping with Poverty*, 26.

peoples in the name of democracy, corporate profit and religion.”⁶⁴

As noted earlier, despite a growing economy and rising median income, the income inequality gap in Brazil has historically remained one of the highest in the world, a situation which should be expected to increase discontent over time and nurture the potential for a demand of redistribution. In their research of this issue, Solt, *et al.* have proposed Relative Power Theory, which holds that income inequality not only makes religion more attractive to the wealthy, but increases their power to spread religion to others.⁶⁵ As money is more concentrated in a small group of people, then power is more concentrated in that same group, and therefore the rich have more power *relative* to the poor. This circumstance allows the wealthy greater power to spread their values among the poor in a way that works to discourage materialism in favor of eternal and spiritual rewards, thus helping to preserve the privileges of the rich and continue the *status quo*.⁶⁶ Although there is insufficient documentation to support this theory of the flow of money from wealthy individuals to Pentecostal churches, in the case of Brazil, such dissemination could be a powerful panacea indeed. More research is needed.

So while religion may offer utility to the poor by providing a source of comfort, it may also be used by the rich as a tool of social control.⁶⁷ All things being equal, greater inequality as manifested by the poor getting poorer and the rich getting richer, *should* result in a reduction of religiosity of the rich, or at least at a certain level, have no effect on their religiosity.⁶⁸ In a study⁶⁹ of data measuring *Average Religiosity by Income Inequality*, and *Estimated Effects of*

64. Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett. *Thy will be done: the conquest of the Amazon : Nelson Rockefeller and Evangelism in the age of oil* (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1995). Back matter.

65. Frederick Solt, Philip Habel, and J. Tobin Grant. “Economic Inequality, Relative Power, and Religiosity.” *Social Science Quarterly* 92, no. 2 (June 2011): 449.

66. Solt, et al., “Economic Inequality, Relative Power”, 463.

67. Solt, et al., “Economic Inequality, Relative Power Theory”, 462.

68. Solt, et al., “Economic Inequality, Relative Power Theory”, 448.

69. Solt, et al., “Economic Inequality, Relative Power Theory”, 462.

Inequality on Religiosity by Income Quintile,⁷⁰ Solt, *et al.* conclude that contrary to deprivation theory, rich people actually exhibit greater religiosity at higher levels of income inequality and that “income inequality has a powerful positive effect on religiosity of all members of society regardless of income.” It is possible that some of the wealthy may seek to use religion for more social control, while others who are sensitive to the gap between themselves and the poor, may seek religion to justify their position of wealth.

In any case, the data shows that “at extremely high levels of inequality, those with the highest incomes are actually predicted to be more likely to identify themselves as religious than are otherwise similar people with the lowest incomes.”⁷¹ This statistic contradicts the belief that religiosity is stronger in those who are poor. However, Solt acknowledges that there has been little empirical research done to examine this relationship, and more research is need.

It has long been understood that religion can be used as a tool to help preserve the *status quo*, but this may ring especially true for Pentecostals in Brazil, whose attitude, as Mariz pointed out, is unique among other religions when it comes to attribution of economic and work success to ‘God’s will’ (also considered part of ‘God’s plan’). Such divine attribution of economic position must not only be seen as a useful coping tool for the poor, but also as a useful tool for the wealthy to help poor people accept their ‘lot in life’, especially when that lot is attributable to no less than a Divine power. Pentecostalism is thereby not only a player in the political arena because of its institutional wealth and authoritarian power to move congregations in the electoral process, but also as a religion whose design is especially conducive as a tool for social control when compared with other religions in Brazil.

Is it possible then that Pentecostalism is being intentionally used as a manipulative tool of

70. See Appendix C, Figures 1 and 3

71. Solt, et al., “Economic Inequality, Relative Power Theory”, 458.

distraction for the poor in Brazil? In their research exploring income and issue voting around the world, De La O and Rodden set out, in part, to examine the Marxian argument that religion undermines the relationship between income and voting by creating a second issue dimension that distracts the poor from their material interests.⁷² By looking at the negative correlation between religiosity and redistribution – that is, why people with low income will often vote against their own economic interests based on issues of religious morality – De La O and Rodden provide empirical support that across advanced democracies, religion does work to break ties between the poor and parties of the left. The drawback to their research in terms of this paper is that they did not include Brazil in their examination of advanced industrial societies. However, their observations regarding the efforts of right-wing parties to strategically target and support conservative moral issues as a method of separating fundamentalist religious groups from liberal policies, and left-wing parties that support the economic interests of the poor, are very relevant to this discussion.

One of the remarkable things that also needs to be mentioned about the individualism promoted by Pentecostalism is that, unlike the Catholic church, which is willing to help anyone who is poor, including non-members, the Pentecostal church does not believe in outreach of material support to the poor in the community, and with the exception of some of the wealthier churches,⁷³ they do not provide material support or charity to their own members, nor do their members expect it. This exclusionary attitude, even when it comes to charity, fits in well with the theme of nationalism that accompanies income inequality. At the same time, the church itself encourages financial contributions even from its poorest constituents as an act of faith, and has

72. A. L. De La O and J.A. Rodden “Does Religion Distract the Poor?: Income and Issue Voting Around the World.” *Comparative Political Studies* 41(2008):468.

73. Cécilia Mariz, *Coping with Poverty*, 82.

not only been highly criticized for this by other religions in Brazil, but the Umbandists actually say that the Pentecostals are downright “greedy.”⁷⁴

Solt has further argued that statistics show economic inequality comes hand-in-hand with a willingness to accept authoritarianism and that the concomitant encouragement of nationalism is a diversion to keep the poor from recognizing income inequality and mobilizing against it.⁷⁵ In a study of the social origins of authoritarianism, he found that economic inequality within countries shapes attitudes toward authority because as the gap widens and relative power of the wealthy increases, individuals are more likely to see hierarchical relationships as natural and more willing to accept authoritarianism.⁷⁶

Christian Smith, on the other hand, argues that because “historically individualism is strongly associated with the functioning of liberal democracy,”⁷⁷ that despite its authoritarian nature, the rational individualism encouraged by the Pentecostal church has potential as a social force in support of democratization.⁷⁸ But while Smith sees the potential of rational individualism to promote participation in a democracy, he overlooks the self-involved nationalistic nature of the individualism being encouraged by the church, as well as the individual's *perceived* disconnection from participation in the democracy. The new Pentecostal believer in Brazil is not an empowered individual who is likely to participate in the democracy outside of authoritarian direction, but rather an individual who, having knowingly suffered from powerlessness, is being manipulated into believing she/he has overcome that powerlessness.

74. Cécilia Mariz, *Coping with Poverty*, 83.

75. Frederick Solt. “Diversionsary Nationalism: Economic Inequality and the Formation of National Pride. *The Journal of Politics* 73, (July 2011): 821.

76. Solt, Frederick. “The Social Origins of Authoritarianism.” *Political Research Quarterly* 65, no. 4 (Dec 2012): 703.

77. Christian Smith. “The Spirit and Democracy: Base Communities, Protestantism, Democratization in Latin America.” *Sociology Of Religion* 55, no. 2 (1994):119.

78. Christian Smith. “The Spirit and Democracy,” 136.

Understanding the potential of the issue driven Pentecostal believer within the democracy is important because it contradicts predictions that institutional fragmentation of Pentecostals will prevent them from developing political power of any concern, or that the impact of any political power they may have “will be smaller than hoped or feared”.⁷⁹

Finally, the method by which the Pentecostal church encourages what is perceived as individualism does have some merit in terms of the self-esteem it is likely to give its constituents, but in light of relative power theory, it also suggests a conspicuous convenience for those in control. The practice of gathering money from members without providing any material support for them, while fostering a mentality that specifically excludes expectation of material assistance or participation with anyone from outside the group, can only serve to reinforce acceptance of authoritarianism and nationalism.

It appears that what began as a post-industrial revolution spiritual revival to bring comfort and healing to people in the poor neighborhoods of southern California, has continued to fulfill its calling of comfort for the powerless, while being usurped by the powerful as a means to convince the have-nots to accept their lot in life. If academic researchers have been able to discern how Pentecostalism lends itself to use as a tool of diversion and social control of the poor, then those who would benefit most from such a powerful tool, surely figured it out long ago.

79. Freston, “A Quiet Tendency”, 22.

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Table A. 2005 Countries Ranked by GINI Index

Rank	Country	GINI Index	Rank	Country	GINI Index
1	Azerbaijan	18.61563	69	Yemen, Republic of	38.13079
2	Slovenia	23.20641	70	Mali	38.21199
3	Denmark	23.59887	71	Malawi	38.57338
4	Sweden	23.7	72	Djibouti	38.92895
5	Slovak Republic	24.32799	73	St. Lucia	39.10148
6	Norway	25.04938	74	Bangladesh	39.12638
7	Finland	25.29313	75	Guinea	39.16703
8	Belgium	25.41214	76	Liberia	39.22559
9	Belarus	25.57714	77	Chad	39.44017
10	Czech Republic	26.35188	78	Jordan	39.44917
11	Iceland	26.41418	79	Mauritius	39.53512
12	Netherlands	26.74618	80	Georgia	39.61722
13	Austria	26.87447	81	China	39.66666
14	Luxembourg	27.56765	82	Uganda	39.69348
15	Bulgaria	27.59195	83	Iran	39.92923
16	Croatia	27.68371	84	Morocco	40.4925
17	Malta	27.75719	85	Turkmenistan	40.73093
18	France	28	86	Singapore	40.86098
19	Ukraine	28.31509	87	Turkey	40.96178
20	Germany	28.45459	88	Mozambique	41.06888
21	Hungary	28.9	89	Gabon	41.24508
22	Ethiopia	29.18617	90	Congo, Republic of	41.36382
23	Cyprus	29.30589	91	Ghana	41.36533
24	Switzerland	29.83401	92	Moldova	41.47818
25	Japan	30.33875	93	Russian Federation	41.62699
26	Taiwan	30.5	94	Venezuela	42.25407
27	Australia	31.00422	95	Niger	42.90371
28	Korea, Republic of	31.02935	96	Uruguay	42.92076
29	Ireland	31.1471	97	Lebanon	42.92404
30	Poland	31.35653	98	Puerto Rico	43.01752
31	Spain	31.4153	99	Philippines	43.05129
32	Albania	31.43553	100	Rwanda	43.19546
33	Romania	31.70604	101	Congo, Democratic R	43.27537
34	Montenegro	31.83057	102	Madagascar	43.61795
35	Canada	31.92331	103	Sierra Leone	43.75809
36	Kyrgyz Republic	32.76967	104	Costa Rica	44.74692
37	Egypt	32.77789	105	El Salvador	45.00086
38	New Zealand	32.86271	106	Argentina	45.67606
39	Serbia	33.12747	107	Mexico	46.07399
40	Greece	33.14656	108	Kenya	46.10921
41	Mongolia	33.15079	109	Swaziland	46.88126
42	Pakistan	33.4505	110	Bhutan	46.95069
43	Italy	33.59571	111	Dominican Republic	47.55025
44	Estonia	33.91154	112	Suriname	48.397
45	India	33.96767	113	Hong Kong	48.62011
46	Burundi	34.00592	114	Lesotho	48.72282
47	Lithuania	34.11016	115	Brazil	48.89679
48	Bosnia and Herzegovina	34.15216	116	Chile	48.9938
49	Togo	34.18234	117	Nicaragua	49.50877
50	Algeria	34.53083	118	Panama	49.95185
51	United Kingdom	34.60025	119	Zambia	49.9909
52	Kazakhstan	35.30977	120	Cape Verde	50.04573
53	Indonesia	35.37492	121	Botswana	50.55334
54	Lao	35.60261	122	Papua New Guinea	50.7367
55	Portugal	35.92988	123	Peru	50.84728
56	Latvia	36.04774	124	Paraguay	50.89317
57	Benin	36.27282	125	Colombia	51.00035
58	Armenia	36.40614	126	Ecuador	51.20006
59	Senegal	36.46976	127	Guatemala	51.35305
60	Tunisia	36.66434	128	Honduras	52.28558
61	Israel	37	129	Bolivia	53.06416
62	Uzbekistan	37.01731	130	Angola	57.89126
63	United States	37.08701	131	Comoros	63.11312
64	Trinidad and Tobago	37.5741	132	South Africa	63.5195
65	Macedonia, FYR	37.59695	133	Namibia	66.63813
66	Guinea-Bissau	37.6561			
67	Malaysia	37.8335			
68	Viet Nam	37.99531			

Table B. Sample Comparison of Growth in Income Inequality¹ vs. Pentecostalism² 1970-2000

HDI Rank in 2000	Country	Income Inequality (GINI Coefficient)							Growth of Pentecostalism						
		1970	1990	1995	2000	Overall Increase or Decrease	Growth in decimals	% Growth	1970	1990	1995	2000	Overall Increase or Decrease	Growth in Decimals	% Growth
74	Brazil	42.4118	52.439	51.498	51.91955	9.51	0.22	22	7.2	46.3	46.6	47.0	39.8	5.53	553
6	Sweden	23.98895	20.966	22.1	25.20000	1.21	0.05	5	3.7	6.6	6.9	7.0	3.3	0.89	89
2	Norway	22.07197	23.221	23.8	25.00000	2.93	0.13	13		27.0	26.6	28.0	1.0	0.04	4
8	Netherlands	25.80183	26.2	25.621	23.85152	-1.95	-0.08	-8		6.3	6.4	6.6	0.3	0.05	5
3	United States	31.07847	33.57	36.244	36.80000	5.72	0.18	18	10.7	25. 0	26.2	27.0	16.3	1.52	152
128	India	34.6937	31.401	33.518	32.44186	-2.25	-0.06	-6		3.1	3.2	3.3	0.2	0.06	6

Correlation = 0.70471

¹ GINI statistics from *The Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWID)*.
² From David Barett, et al., *World Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative Study of Churches and Religions i*

Table C. 2000 Countries Ranked by GINI Index

Rank	Country	GINI Index	Rank	Country	GINI Index
1	Denmark	22.5	72	Ghana	38.66319
2	Netherlands	23.85152	73	St. Lucia	39.32022
3	Bulgaria	24.09009	74	Senegal	39.34562
4	Slovak Republic	24.14499	75	Singapore	39.66674
5	Finland	24.6	76	Djibouti	39.69599
6	Slovenia	24.75473	77	Morocco	39.87928
7	Norway	25	78	Guinea	40.05529
8	Sweden	25.2	79	Tunisia	40.13733
9	Austria	25.7	80	Mauritius	40.18535
10	Luxembourg	26	81	Armenia	40.5553
11	Czech Republic	26.12981	82	Mali	41.26604
12	Iceland	26.41089	83	Uruguay	42.07724
13	Belarus	27.24871	84	Moldova	42.40331
14	Cyprus	27.44013	85	Turkey	42.54047
15	Germany	27.5	86	Iran	42.67017
16	Romania	27.64459	87	Venezuela	42.71492
17	France	27.8	88	Mozambique	43.05385
18	Belgium	27.9	89	Lebanon	43.38559
19	Switzerland	28	90	Russian Federati	43.4
20	Hungary	28.49049	91	Puerto Rico	43.60297
21	Bosnia and Herzegovir	28.52534	92	Cambodia	43.81113
22	Poland	28.63375	93	Costa Rica	44.113
23	Taiwan	28.9	94	Madagascar	44.45781
24	Albania	29.00245	95	Nepal	44.60774
25	Serbia and Montenegro	29.40376	96	Cameroon	44.6489
26	Korea, Republic of	29.69439	97	Malawi	44.88077
27	Montenegro	29.9516	98	Sri Lanka	44.96283
28	Malta	30.64935	99	Cote d'Ivoire	44.99813
29	Croatia	31.08129	100	Philippines	45.00458
30	Ireland	31.3	101	Niger	45.22618
31	Azerbaijan	31.43489	102	Hong Kong	45.97879
32	Canada	31.5	103	Kenya	46.15197
33	Tajikistan	31.67925	104	Thailand	46.25727
34	Australia	31.6885	105	Uganda	46.41862
35	Pakistan	31.78497	106	Argentina	46.69929
36	Kazakhstan	32.41473	107	Rwanda	46.71782
37	India	32.44186	108	Central African	46.71833
38	Indonesia	32.46549	109	Bahamas	46.79119
39	Kyrgyz Republic	32.54451	110	Nigeria	46.97179
40	Ukraine	32.69234	111	Malaysia	47.02662
41	Japan	32.75501	112	Dominican Repu	47.1074
42	Macedonia, FYR	32.92113	113	Gambia	47.27573
43	Mongolia	32.95449	114	Sierra Leone	47.6336
44	Lithuania	33.07193	115	El Salvador	48.10117
45	Turkmenistan	33.1445	116	Papua New Guin	48.33247
46	Latvia	33.16035	117	Suriname	48.68386
47	Greece	33.3	118	Jamaica	48.73756
48	Italy	33.3	119	Mexico	49.1
49	New Zealand	33.50341	120	Honduras	49.90186
50	Yemen, Republic of	33.55442	121	Swaziland	50.00053
51	Spain	33.6	122	Colombia	50.55997
52	Ethiopia	34.01781	123	Panama	51.28093
53	United Kingdom	34.18522	124	Chile	51.47354
54	Tanzania	34.32567	125	Nicaragua	51.50872
55	Israel	34.3586	126	Brazil	51.91955
56	Uzbekistan	34.79325	127	Botswana	52.11085
57	Lao	35.15971	128	Guatemala	52.18929
58	Portugal	35.36594	129	Ecuador	52.36807
59	Algeria	35.48988	130	Paraguay	52.61308
60	Bangladesh	35.52248	131	Zambia	53.54766
61	Mauritania	35.90786	132	Peru	54.02968
62	Viet Nam	35.96214	133	Haiti	54.17335
63	Egypt	36.0066	134	Cape Verde	54.46241
64	Estonia	36.1	135	Bolivia	54.72391
65	United States	36.8	136	Sao Tome and P	54.80819
66	Trinidad and Tobago	37.48408	137	Burkina Faso	55.40472
67	Guinea-Bissau	37.58267	138	Lesotho	56.22743
68	Burundi	37.86771	139	Angola	58.49285
69	Jordan	38.21426	140	Namibia	64.43818
70	Georgia	38.47487	141	South Africa	64.61793
71	China	38.4975			

Appendix A

**Tabela 1.4.1 - População residente, por situação do domicílio e sexo,
segundo os grupos de religião - Brasil - 2010**

(continua)

Grupos de religião	População residente								
	Total	Homens	Mulheres	Situação do domicílio					
				Urbana			Rural		
				Total	Sexo		Total	Sexo	
					Homens	Mulheres		Homens	Mulheres
Total (1)	190 755 799	93 406 990	97 348 809	160 934 649	77 715 676	83 218 972	29 821 150	15 691 314	14 129 837
Católica Apostólica Romana	123 280 172	61 180 316	62 099 856	100 055 896	48 872 817	51 183 078	23 224 277	12 307 499	10 916 778
Católica Apostólica Brasileira	560 781	282 011	278 770	442 244	218 107	224 137	118 537	63 904	54 633
Católica Ortodoxa	131 571	65 727	65 844	113 301	55 942	57 359	18 270	9 785	8 485
Evangélicas	42 275 440	18 782 831	23 492 609	37 824 089	16 663 271	21 160 818	4 451 350	2 119 560	2 331 791
Evangélicas de Missão	7 686 827	3 409 082	4 277 745	6 795 167	2 978 485	3 816 682	891 659	430 597	461 063
Igreja Evangélica Luterana	999 498	482 382	517 116	686 349	321 395	364 954	313 149	160 987	152 162
Igreja Evangélica Presbiteriana	921 209	405 424	515 785	853 864	373 752	480 112	67 345	31 673	35 672
Igreja Evangélica Metodista	340 938	149 047	191 891	325 652	142 148	183 504	15 286	6 899	8 387
Igreja Evangélica Batista	3 723 853	1 605 823	2 118 029	3 466 862	1 488 390	1 978 472	256 991	117 434	139 557
Igreja Evangélica Congrega- cional	109 591	48 243	61 348	94 270	40 878	53 392	15 321	7 365	7 957
Igreja Evangélica Adventista	1 561 071	704 376	856 695	1 341 018	599 837	741 182	220 053	104 539	115 513
Outras Evangélicas de Missão	30 666	13 786	16 880	27 151	12 085	15 066	3 514	1 701	1 814
Evangélicas de origem pentecostal	25 370 484	11 273 195	14 097 289	22 371 352	9 855 098	12 516 253	2 999 132	1 418 097	1 581 035
Igreja Assembléia de Deus	12 314 410	5 586 520	6 727 891	10 366 497	4 662 726	5 703 772	1 947 913	923 794	1 024 119
Igreja Congregação Cristã do Brasil	2 289 634	1 060 218	1 229 416	2 006 550	924 354	1 082 196	283 083	135 863	147 220
Igreja o Brasil para Cristo	196 665	85 768	110 897	177 634	77 173	100 461	19 031	8 595	10 436
Igreja Evangelho Quadrangular	1 808 389	774 696	1 033 693	1 706 628	727 634	978 994	101 761	47 062	54 699
Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus	1 873 243	756 203	1 117 040	1 766 246	708 533	1 057 713	106 998	47 670	59 328
Igreja Casa da Benção	125 550	52 274	73 276	118 659	49 177	69 483	6 890	3 097	3 793
Igreja Deus é Amor	845 383	365 250	480 133	723 155	308 092	415 063	122 228	57 159	65 069
Igreja Maranata	356 021	156 185	199 835	339 526	148 657	190 869	16 495	7 529	8 966
Igreja Nova Vida	90 568	37 026	53 542	88 898	36 342	52 556	1 670	684	986
Evangélica renovada não deter- minada	23 461	10 412	13 049	21 605	9 549	12 056	1 856	863	993
Comunidade Evangélica	180 130	77 990	102 141	174 584	75 456	99 128	5 546	2 533	3 013
Outras igrejas Evangélicas de origem pentecostal	5 267 029	2 310 653	2 956 377	4 881 368	2 127 405	2 753 963	385 661	183 247	202 414
Evangélica não determinada	9 218 129	4 100 554	5 117 575	8 657 570	3 829 688	4 827 883	560 559	270 866	289 693

**Tabela 1.4.1 - População residente, por situação do domicílio e sexo,
segundo os grupos de religião - Brasil - 2010**

(conclusão)

Grupos de religião	População residente								
	Total	Homens	Mulheres	Situação do domicílio					
				Urbana			Rural		
				Total	Sexo		Total	Sexo	
					Homens	Mulheres		Homens	Mulheres
Outras religiosidades cristãs	1 461 495	666 772	794 723	1 350 719	613 118	737 601	110 776	53 654	57 122
Igreja de Jesus Cristo dos Santos dos Últimos Dias	226 509	107 144	119 366	222 224	104 957	117 266	4 286	2 186	2 099
Testemunhas de Jeová	1 393 208	579 466	813 742	1 328 406	550 262	778 144	64 801	29 204	35 598
Espiritualista	61 739	24 857	36 882	59 131	23 702	35 429	2 608	1 155	1 453
Espírita	3 848 876	1 581 701	2 267 176	3 776 857	1 546 013	2 230 843	72 020	35 687	36 332
Umbanda	407 331	182 119	225 213	398 506	177 546	220 960	8 825	4 572	4 253
Candomblé	167 363	80 733	86 630	163 115	78 584	84 531	4 248	2 149	2 099
Outras declarações de religiosidades afro brasileira	14 103	6 636	7 467	13 816	6 484	7 332	287	152	135
Judaísmo	107 329	53 885	53 444	105 342	52 821	52 520	1 987	1 063	924
Hinduismo	5 675	2 942	2 733	5 598	2 899	2 699	77	43	33
Budismo	243 966	110 403	133 563	235 649	106 116	129 533	8 316	4 287	4 030
Novas Religiões Orientais	155 951	63 813	92 139	150 597	61 261	89 336	5 355	2 552	2 803
Igreja messiânica mundial	103 716	41 980	61 736	100 221	40 326	59 895	3 496	1 654	1 842
Outras novas religiões orientais	52 235	21 833	30 402	50 376	20 935	29 441	1 859	898	961
Outras Religiões Orientais	9 675	4 502	5 173	9 491	4 401	5 090	185	101	83
Islamismo	35 167	21 042	14 124	34 894	20 849	14 044	273	193	80
Tradições Esotéricas	74 013	42 095	31 918	70 878	40 219	30 659	3 136	1 876	1 259
Tradições Indígenas	63 082	32 095	30 987	19 366	9 832	9 534	43 716	22 263	21 453
Outras Religiosidades	11 306	5 135	6 171	9 925	4 426	5 500	1 380	709	671
Sem religião	15 335 510	9 082 507	6 253 004	13 742 551	8 103 211	5 639 340	1 592 960	979 296	613 664
Sem religião	14 595 979	8 592 492	6 003 486	13 043 340	7 640 022	5 403 318	1 552 638	952 470	600 168
Ateu	615 096	411 397	203 699	577 994	386 643	191 351	37 102	24 753	12 348
Agnóstico	124 436	78 618	45 818	121 216	76 545	44 671	3 220	2 072	1 147
Não determinada e múltiplo pertencimento	643 598	302 807	340 791	591 792	276 476	315 315	51 807	26 331	25 475
Religiosidade não determinada/ mal definida	628 219	295 713	332 506	578 347	270 469	307 878	49 872	25 244	24 628
Declaração de múltipla religiosidade	15 379	7 094	8 284	13 445	6 007	7 438	1 934	1 087	847

Fonte: IBGE, Censo Demográfico 2010.

(1) Inclusive as pessoas sem declaração de religião e não sabiam.

Appendix B

1 Human development index

HDI rank	Life expectancy at birth (years) 1998	Adult literacy rate (% age 15 and above) 1998	Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (%) 1998 ^a	GDP per capita (PPP US\$) 1998	Life expectancy index	Education index	GDP index	Human development index (HDI) value 1998	GDP per capita (PPP US\$) rank minus HDI rank ^b
High human development									
1 Canada	79.1	99.0 ^c	100	23,582	0.90	0.99	0.91	0.935	8
2 Norway	78.3	99.0 ^c	97	26,342	0.89	0.98	0.93	0.934	1
3 United States	76.8	99.0 ^c	94	29,605	0.86	0.97	0.95	0.929	-1
4 Australia	78.3	99.0 ^c	114 ^d	22,452	0.89	0.99	0.90	0.929	9
5 Iceland	79.1	99.0 ^c	89	25,110	0.90	0.96	0.92	0.927	1
6 Sweden	78.7	99.0 ^c	102 ^d	20,659	0.90	0.99	0.89	0.926	15
7 Belgium	77.3	99.0 ^c	106 ^d	23,223	0.87	0.99	0.91	0.925	4
8 Netherlands	78.0	99.0 ^c	99	22,176	0.88	0.99	0.90	0.925	6
9 Japan	80.0	99.0 ^c	85	23,257	0.92	0.94	0.91	0.924	1
10 United Kingdom	77.3	99.0 ^c	105 ^d	20,336	0.87	0.99	0.89	0.918	13
11 Finland	77.0	99.0 ^c	101 ^d	20,847	0.87	0.99	0.89	0.917	8
12 France	78.2	99.0 ^c	93	21,175	0.89	0.97	0.89	0.917	5
13 Switzerland	78.7	99.0 ^c	80	25,512	0.90	0.93	0.92	0.915	-9
14 Germany	77.3	99.0 ^c	90	22,169	0.87	0.96	0.90	0.911	1
15 Denmark	75.7	99.0 ^c	93	24,218	0.85	0.97	0.92	0.911	-8
16 Austria	77.1	99.0 ^c	86	23,166	0.87	0.95	0.91	0.908	-4
17 Luxembourg	76.8	99.0 ^c	69 ^e	33,505	0.86	0.89	0.97	0.908	-16
18 Ireland	76.6	99.0 ^c	91	21,482	0.86	0.96	0.90	0.907	-2
19 Italy	78.3	98.3	83	20,585	0.89	0.93	0.89	0.903	3
20 New Zealand	77.1	99.0 ^c	96	17,288	0.87	0.98	0.86	0.903	7
21 Spain	78.1	97.4	94	16,212	0.89	0.96	0.85	0.899	9
22 Cyprus	77.9	96.6	81 ^f	17,482	0.88	0.92	0.86	0.886	3
23 Israel	77.9	95.7	81	17,301	0.88	0.91	0.86	0.883	3
24 Singapore	77.3	91.8	73	24,210	0.87	0.86	0.92	0.881	-16
25 Greece	78.2	96.9	81	13,943	0.89	0.91	0.82	0.875	9
26 Hong Kong, China (SAR)	78.6	92.9	64	20,763	0.89	0.83	0.89	0.872	-6
27 Malta	77.3	91.5	79	16,447	0.87	0.87	0.85	0.865	2
28 Portugal	75.5	91.4	93	14,701	0.84	0.92	0.83	0.864	3
29 Slovenia	74.6	99.6 ^g	81	14,293	0.83	0.93	0.83	0.861	4
30 Barbados	76.5	97.0 ^{h,i}	80	12,001 ^{i,j}	0.86	0.91	0.80	0.858	9
31 Korea, Rep. of	72.6	97.5	90	13,478	0.79	0.95	0.82	0.854	4
32 Brunei Darussalam	75.7	90.7	72	16,765	0.84	0.84	0.85	0.848	-4
33 Bahamas	74.0	95.5	74	14,614	0.82	0.88	0.83	0.844	-1
34 Czech Republic	74.1	99.0 ^c	74	12,362	0.82	0.91	0.80	0.843	3
35 Argentina	73.1	96.7	80	12,013	0.80	0.91	0.80	0.837	3
36 Kuwait	76.1	80.9	58	25,314 ^{i,j}	0.85	0.73	0.92	0.836	-31
37 Antigua and Barbuda	76.0 ^h	95.0 ^{h,i}	78 ^c	9,277	0.85	0.89	0.76	0.833	9
38 Chile	75.1	95.4	78	8,787	0.83	0.90	0.75	0.826	9
39 Uruguay	74.1	97.6	78	8,623	0.82	0.91	0.74	0.825	9
40 Slovakia	73.1	99.0 ^c	75	9,699	0.80	0.91	0.76	0.825	5
41 Bahrain	73.1	86.5	81	13,111	0.80	0.85	0.81	0.820	-5
42 Qatar	71.9	80.4	74	20,987 ^{i,j}	0.78	0.78	0.89	0.819	-24
43 Hungary	71.1	99.3 ^g	75	10,232	0.77	0.91	0.77	0.817	-1
44 Poland	72.7	99.7 ^g	79	7,619	0.80	0.92	0.72	0.814	10
45 United Arab Emirates	75.0	74.6	70	17,719	0.83	0.73	0.86	0.810	-21
46 Estonia	69.0	99.0 ^c	86	7,682	0.73	0.95	0.72	0.801	7
Medium human development									
47 Saint Kitts and Nevis	70.0 ^h	90.0 ^{h,i}	79 ^c	10,672	0.75	0.86	0.78	0.798	-7
48 Costa Rica	76.2	95.3	66	5,987	0.85	0.85	0.68	0.797	18
49 Croatia	72.8	98.0	69	6,749	0.80	0.88	0.70	0.795	7
50 Trinidad and Tobago	74.0	93.4	66	7,485	0.82	0.84	0.72	0.793	5

Human development index

HDI rank	development index		Adult literacy rate (% age 15 and above) 1998	Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (%) 1998 ^a	GDP per capita (PPP US\$) 1998	Life expectancy index	Education index	GDP index	Human development index (HDI) value 1998	GDP per capita (PPP US\$) rank minus HDI rank ^b
	Life expectancy at birth (years) 1998									
51	Dominica	76.0 ^h	94.0 ^{i,k}	74 ^c	5,102	0.85	0.87	0.66	0.793	27
52	Lithuania	70.2	99.5 ^g	77	6,436	0.75	0.92	0.70	0.789	8
53	Seychelles	71.0 ^h	84.0 ^{h,i}	76 ^c	10,600	0.77	0.81	0.78	0.786	-12
54	Grenada	72.0 ^h	96.0 ^{h,i}	76 ^c	5,838	0.78	0.89	0.68	0.785	13
55	Mexico	72.3	90.8	70	7,704	0.79	0.84	0.73	0.784	-3
56	Cuba	75.8	96.4	73	3,967 ^l	0.85	0.89	0.61	0.783	40
57	Belarus	68.1	99.5 ^g	82	6,319	0.72	0.93	0.69	0.781	6
58	Belize	74.9	92.7	73	4,566	0.83	0.86	0.64	0.777	25
59	Panama	73.8	91.4	73	5,249	0.81	0.85	0.66	0.776	14
60	Bulgaria	71.3	98.2	73	4,809	0.77	0.90	0.65	0.772	19
61	Malaysia	72.2	86.4	65	8,137	0.79	0.79	0.73	0.772	-10
62	Russian Federation	66.7	99.5 ^g	79	6,460	0.69	0.92	0.70	0.771	-3
63	Latvia	68.7	99.8 ^g	75	5,728	0.73	0.91	0.68	0.771	6
64	Romania	70.2	97.9	70	5,648	0.75	0.88	0.67	0.770	6
65	Venezuela	72.6	92.0	67	5,808	0.79	0.84	0.68	0.770	3
66	Fiji	72.9	92.2	81	4,231	0.80	0.88	0.63	0.769	23
67	Suriname	70.3	93.0 ^{h,i}	80	5,161 ^{i,j}	0.76	0.89	0.66	0.766	9
68	Colombia	70.7	91.2	71	6,006	0.76	0.85	0.68	0.764	-3
69	Macedonia, TFYR	73.2	94.6 ^{i,m}	69	4,254	0.80	0.86	0.63	0.763	19
70	Georgia	72.9	99.0 ^{h,i}	72	3,353	0.80	0.90	0.59	0.762	29
71	Mauritius	71.6	83.8	63	8,312	0.78	0.77	0.74	0.761	-21
72	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	70.2	78.1	92	6,697 ^{i,j}	0.75	0.83	0.70	0.760	-15
73	Kazakhstan	67.9	99.0 ^c	77	4,378	0.72	0.92	0.63	0.754	11
74	Brazil	67.0	84.5	84	6,625	0.70	0.84	0.70	0.747	-16
75	Saudi Arabia	71.7	75.2	57	10,158	0.78	0.69	0.77	0.747	-32
76	Thailand	68.9	95.0	61	5,456	0.73	0.84	0.67	0.745	-5
77	Philippines	68.6	94.8	83	3,555	0.73	0.91	0.60	0.744	17
78	Ukraine	69.1	99.6 ^g	78	3,194	0.73	0.92	0.58	0.744	26
79	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	73.0 ^h	82.0 ^{h,i}	68 ^c	4,692	0.80	0.77	0.64	0.738	2
80	Peru	68.6	89.2	79	4,282	0.73	0.86	0.63	0.737	7
81	Paraguay	69.8	92.8	65	4,288	0.75	0.84	0.63	0.736	5
82	Lebanon	70.1	85.1	77	4,326	0.75	0.82	0.63	0.735	3
83	Jamaica	75.0	86.0	63	3,389	0.83	0.78	0.59	0.735	15
84	Sri Lanka	73.3	91.1	66	2,979	0.81	0.83	0.57	0.733	25
85	Turkey	69.3	84.0	61	6,422	0.74	0.76	0.69	0.732	-24
86	Oman	71.1	68.8	58	9,960 ^{i,j}	0.77	0.65	0.77	0.730	-42
87	Dominican Republic	70.9	82.8	70	4,598	0.76	0.79	0.64	0.729	-5
88	Saint Lucia	70.0 ^h	82.0 ^{i,k}	68 ^c	5,183	0.75	0.77	0.66	0.728	-14
89	Maldives	65.0	96.0	75	4,083	0.67	0.89	0.62	0.725	1
90	Azerbaijan	70.1	99.0 ^c	72	2,175	0.75	0.90	0.51	0.722	29
91	Ecuador	69.7	90.6	75	3,003	0.75	0.85	0.57	0.722	17
92	Jordan	70.4	88.6	69 ^c	3,347	0.76	0.82	0.59	0.721	8
93	Armenia	70.7	98.2	72	2,072	0.76	0.90	0.51	0.721	29
94	Albania	72.9	83.5	69	2,804	0.80	0.78	0.56	0.713	17
95	Samoa (Western)	71.7	79.7	65	3,832	0.78	0.75	0.61	0.711	-3
96	Guyana	64.8	98.3	66	3,403	0.66	0.88	0.59	0.709	1
97	Iran, Islamic Rep. of	69.5	74.6	69	5,121	0.74	0.73	0.66	0.709	-20
98	Kyrgyzstan	68.0	97.0 ^{h,i}	70	2,317	0.72	0.88	0.52	0.706	19
99	China	70.1	82.8	72	3,105	0.75	0.79	0.57	0.706	7
100	Turkmenistan	65.7	98.0 ^{h,i}	72 ^c	2,550 ⁱ	0.68	0.89	0.54	0.704	14

Human development index

HDI rank	Life expectancy at birth (years) 1998	Adult literacy rate (% age 15 and above) 1998	Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (%) 1998 ^a	GDP per capita (PPP US\$) 1998	Life expectancy index	Education index	GDP index	Human development index (HDI) value 1998	GDP per capita (PPP US\$) rank minus HDI rank ^b
101 Tunisia	69.8	68.7	72	5,404	0.75	0.70	0.67	0.703	-29
102 Moldova, Rep. of	67.8	98.6	70	1,947	0.71	0.89	0.50	0.700	22
103 South Africa	53.2	84.6	95	8,488	0.47	0.88	0.74	0.697	-54
104 El Salvador	69.4	77.8	64	4,036	0.74	0.73	0.62	0.696	-13
105 Cape Verde	69.2	72.9	78	3,233	0.74	0.75	0.58	0.688	-3
106 Uzbekistan	67.8	88.0	77	2,053	0.71	0.84	0.50	0.686	17
107 Algeria	69.2	65.5	69	4,792	0.74	0.67	0.65	0.683	-27
108 Viet Nam	67.8	92.9	63	1,689	0.71	0.83	0.47	0.671	24
109 Indonesia	65.6	85.7	65	2,651	0.68	0.79	0.55	0.670	4
110 Tajikistan	67.5	99.0	69	1,041	0.71	0.89	0.39	0.663	43
111 Syrian Arab Republic	69.2	72.7	59	2,892	0.74	0.68	0.56	0.660	-1
112 Swaziland	60.7	78.3	72	3,816	0.60	0.76	0.61	0.655	-19
113 Honduras	69.6	73.4	58	2,433	0.74	0.68	0.53	0.653	2
114 Bolivia	61.8	84.4	70	2,269	0.61	0.80	0.52	0.643	4
115 Namibia	50.1	80.8	84	5,176	0.42	0.82	0.66	0.632	-40
116 Nicaragua	68.1	67.9	63	2,142	0.72	0.66	0.51	0.631	4
117 Mongolia	66.2	83.0 ^{h,i}	57	1,541	0.69	0.74	0.46	0.628	10
118 Vanuatu	67.7	64.0 ^{h,i}	47	3,120	0.71	0.58	0.57	0.623	-12
119 Egypt	66.7	53.7	74	3,041	0.69	0.60	0.57	0.623	-11
120 Guatemala	64.4	67.3	47	3,505	0.66	0.61	0.59	0.619	-24
121 Solomon Islands	71.9	62.0 ^{h,i}	46	1,940	0.78	0.57	0.49	0.614	5
122 Botswana	46.2	75.6	71	6,103	0.35	0.74	0.69	0.593	-57
123 Gabon	52.4	63.0 ^{h,i}	63 ^c	6,353	0.46	0.63	0.69	0.592	-60
124 Morocco	67.0	47.1	50	3,305	0.70	0.48	0.58	0.589	-22
125 Myanmar	60.6	84.1	56	1,199 ^{i,j}	0.59	0.75	0.41	0.585	25
126 Iraq	63.8	53.7	50	3,197 ^{i,j}	0.65	0.52	0.58	0.583	-22
127 Lesotho	55.2	82.4	57	1,626	0.50	0.74	0.47	0.569	6
128 India	62.9	55.7	54	2,077	0.63	0.55	0.51	0.563	-7
129 Ghana	60.4	69.1	43	1,735	0.59	0.60	0.48	0.556	0
130 Zimbabwe	43.5	87.2	68	2,669	0.31	0.81	0.55	0.555	-18
131 Equatorial Guinea	50.4	81.1	65	1,817 ^{i,j}	0.42	0.76	0.48	0.555	-4
132 São Tomé and Príncipe	64.0 ^h	57.0 ^{h,i}	49 ^c	1,469	0.65	0.54	0.45	0.547	7
133 Papua New Guinea	58.3	63.2	37	2,359	0.55	0.54	0.53	0.542	-17
134 Cameroon	54.5	73.6	46	1,474	0.49	0.64	0.45	0.528	4
135 Pakistan	64.4	44.0	43	1,715	0.66	0.44	0.47	0.522	-4
136 Cambodia	53.5	65.0 ^{h,i}	61	1,257	0.48	0.64	0.42	0.512	1
137 Comoros	59.2	58.5	39	1,398	0.57	0.52	0.44	0.510	5
138 Kenya	51.3	80.5	50	980	0.44	0.70	0.38	0.508	18
139 Congo	48.9	78.4	65	995	0.40	0.74	0.38	0.507	16
Low human development									
140 Lao People's Dem. Rep.	53.7	46.1	57	1,734	0.48	0.50	0.48	0.484	-9
141 Madagascar	57.9	64.9	40	756	0.55	0.56	0.34	0.483	23
142 Bhutan	61.2	42.0 ^{h,i}	33 ^m	1,536	0.60	0.39	0.46	0.483	-4
143 Sudan	55.4	55.7	34	1,394	0.51	0.48	0.44	0.477	0
144 Nepal	57.8	39.2	61	1,157	0.55	0.46	0.41	0.474	7
145 Togo	49.0	55.2	62	1,372	0.40	0.57	0.44	0.471	0
146 Bangladesh	58.6	40.1	36	1,361	0.56	0.39	0.44	0.461	0
147 Mauritania	53.9	41.2	42	1,563	0.48	0.41	0.46	0.451	-11
148 Yemen	58.5	44.1	49	719	0.56	0.46	0.33	0.448	18
149 Djibouti	50.8	62.3	21	1,266 ^{i,j}	0.43	0.49	0.42	0.447	-2
150 Haiti	54.0	47.8	24	1,383	0.48	0.40	0.44	0.440	-7

1 Human development index

HDI rank	Life expectancy at birth (years) 1998	Adult literacy rate (% age 15 and above) 1998	Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (%) 1998 ^a	GDP per capita (PPP US\$) 1998	Life expectancy index	Education index	GDP index	Human development index (HDI) value 1998	GDP per capita (PPP US\$) rank minus HDI rank ^b
151 Nigeria	50.1	61.1	43	795	0.42	0.55	0.35	0.439	10
152 Congo, Dem. Rep. of the	51.2	58.9	33	822	0.44	0.50	0.35	0.430	8
153 Zambia	40.5	76.3	49	719	0.26	0.67	0.33	0.420	12
154 Côte d'Ivoire	46.9	44.5	41	1,598	0.36	0.43	0.46	0.420	-20
155 Senegal	52.7	35.5	36	1,307	0.46	0.36	0.43	0.416	-9
156 Tanzania, U. Rep. of	47.9	73.6	33	480	0.38	0.60	0.26	0.415	17
157 Benin	53.5	37.7	43	867	0.47	0.40	0.36	0.411	0
158 Uganda	40.7	65.0	41	1,074	0.26	0.57	0.40	0.409	-6
159 Eritrea	51.1	51.7	27	833	0.43	0.44	0.35	0.408	0
160 Angola	47.0	42.0 ^{h, i}	25	1,821	0.37	0.36	0.48	0.405	-34
161 Gambia	47.4	34.6	41	1,453	0.37	0.37	0.45	0.396	-21
162 Guinea	46.9	36.0 ^{h, i}	29	1,782	0.37	0.34	0.48	0.394	-34
163 Malawi	39.5	58.2	75	523	0.24	0.64	0.28	0.385	9
164 Rwanda	40.6	64.0	43	660 ^{i, n}	0.26	0.57	0.31	0.382	4
165 Mali	53.7	38.2	26	681	0.48	0.34	0.32	0.380	2
166 Central African Republic	44.8	44.0	26	1,118	0.33	0.38	0.40	0.371	-15
167 Chad	47.5	39.4	32	856	0.38	0.37	0.36	0.367	-9
168 Mozambique	43.8	42.3	25	782	0.31	0.37	0.34	0.341	-6
169 Guinea-Bissau	44.9	36.7	34	616	0.33	0.36	0.30	0.331	0
170 Burundi	42.7	45.8	22	570	0.30	0.38	0.29	0.321	1
171 Ethiopia	43.4	36.3	26	574	0.31	0.33	0.29	0.309	-1
172 Burkina Faso	44.7	22.2	22	870	0.33	0.22	0.36	0.303	-16
173 Niger	48.9	14.7	15	739	0.40	0.15	0.33	0.293	-9
174 Sierra Leone	37.9	31.0 ^{h, i}	24 ^c	458	0.22	0.29	0.25	0.252	0
All developing countries	64.7	72.3	60	3,270	0.66	0.68	0.58	0.642	-
Least developed countries	51.9	50.7	37	1,064	0.45	0.46	0.39	0.435	-
Arab States	66.0	59.7	60	4,140	0.68	0.60	0.62	0.635	-
East Asia	70.2	83.4	73	3,564	0.75	0.80	0.60	0.716	-
East Asia (excluding China)	73.1	96.3	85	13,635	0.80	0.93	0.82	0.849	-
Latin America and the Caribbean	69.7	87.7	74	6,510	0.74	0.83	0.70	0.758	-
South Asia	63.0	54.3	52	2,112	0.63	0.54	0.51	0.560	-
South Asia (excluding India)	63.4	50.5	47	2,207	0.64	0.49	0.52	0.550	-
South-East Asia and the Pacific	66.3	88.2	66	3,234	0.69	0.81	0.58	0.691	-
Sub-Saharan Africa	48.9	58.5	42	1,607	0.40	0.53	0.46	0.464	-
Eastern Europe and the CIS	68.9	98.6	76	6,200	0.73	0.91	0.69	0.777	-
OECD	76.4	97.4	86	20,357	0.86	0.94	0.89	0.893	-
High human development	77.0	98.5	90	21,799	0.87	0.96	0.90	0.908	-
Medium human development	66.9	76.9	65	3,458	0.70	0.73	0.59	0.673	-
Low human development	50.9	48.8	37	994	0.43	0.45	0.38	0.421	-
High income	77.8	98.6	92	23,928	0.88	0.96	0.91	0.920	-
Medium income	68.8	87.8	73	6,241	0.73	0.83	0.69	0.750	-
Low income	63.4	68.9	56	2,244	0.64	0.65	0.52	0.602	-
World	66.9	78.8	64	6,526	0.70	0.74	0.70	0.712	-

Note: The human development index has been calculated for UN member countries with reliable data in each of its components, as well as for two non-members, Switzerland and Hong Kong, China (SAR). For data on the remaining 16 UN member countries see table 32.

a. Preliminary UNESCO estimates, subject to further revision. b. A positive figure indicates that the HDI rank is higher than the GDP per capita (PPP US\$) rank, a negative the opposite. c. Human Development Report Office estimate. d. For purposes of calculating the HDI, a value of 100.0% was applied. e. The ratio is an underestimate, as many secondary and tertiary students pursue their studies in nearby countries. f. Not including Turkish students or population. g. For purposes of calculating the HDI, a value of 99.0% was applied. h. UNICEF 1999c. i. Data refer to a year or period other than that specified in the column heading, differ from the standard definition or refer to only part of the country. j. Heston and Summers 1999. k. UNICEF 1996. l. As GDP per capita (PPP US\$) is not available for Cuba, the sub-regional weighted average for the Caribbean was used. m. Human Development Report Office estimate based on national sources. n. World Bank 1999a.

Source: Column 1: unless otherwise noted, interpolated on the basis of life expectancy data from UN 1998c; column 2: unless otherwise noted, UNESCO 2000a; column 3: unless otherwise noted, UNESCO 2000c; column 4: unless otherwise noted, World Bank 2000a; columns 5-9: Human Development Report Office calculations; see the technical note for details.


Appendix C

2009). We use SWIID data on the Gini index of inequality in net household income, which has a theoretical range from 0, perfect equality, to 100, perfect inequality. The lowest observed level of income inequality in our data set, 17.5, was found in 1990 in the Slovak lands of then-Czechoslovakia; the highest, 60.6, occurred in South Africa in 2001.

Figure 1 displays the bivariate relationships between income inequality and average religiosity across the society-years in our sample. All the WVS/EVS items display powerful and easily visible connections to income in-

FIGURE 1

Average Religiosity by Income Inequality, WVS/EVS 1981–2007



Most striking, however, is the strong support for the relative power theory. Economic inequality is estimated to powerfully increase religiosity and to do so regardless of income. The competing hypothesis provided by deprivation theory that inequality increases religiosity among the poor but decreases it among the rich is not supported for any aspect of religiosity considered, as can be seen in the graphs of Figure 3. These graphs display how the predicted probabilities (or values, for the three ordinal variables) of

FIGURE 3

Estimated Effects of Inequality on Religiosity by Income Quintile

